<p>My plan has three parts. First, I address the concern that the problem between divine foreknowledge and free will is merely a pseudo-problem, arguing that it remains philosophically serious and warrants attention. To support this case, I consider Dennett’s dismissal of the divine foreknowledge-freedom problem, arguing that this dismissal is too hasty. Second, I argue that the eternity solution popularized by Stump and Kretzmann, and later defended by Rogers, Rota, Timpe, Diekemper, De Florio, and Frigerio, fails to respond to van Inwagen’s Freedom-Denying Prophetic Object thought experiment. Additionally, I offer an alternative explanation to van Inwagen’s for why even the mere possibility of divine prophecy threatens free will. Third, I defend van Inwagen’s limited foreknowledge approach by responding to recent critiques from Todd and Arbour and by addressing a uniquely Christian concern regarding Jesus as a freedom-denying prophetic object. The defense is not intended to defeat Todd and Arbour’s objections but only to neutralize them.</p>