On Being and Bonaventure: a Franciscan ontological argument
摘要
Scholastic and analytic philosophers have often criticized those Medieval ontological arguments which were inspired by Anselm’s Proslogion. Notably, Thomas Aquinas famously rejected contemporary ontological arguments on the grounds that they are committed to the mistaken thesis that God’s existence is self-evident. For Aquinas, the proposition “God exists” can only be self-evident to those who grasp God’s essence, yet we cannot possess such knowledge in this life. Meanwhile, analytic philosophers emphasize another criticism which was also anticipated by Aquinas: the charge that valid classical ontological arguments are question-begging, since they assume at the outset that some relevant description of God has an extramental referent. In this paper, we suggest that Scholastic ontological arguments may be more persuasive than critics allow. In particular, we seek to revive Bonaventure’s ontological argument for God’s existence outlined in Journey of the Mind to God, Chapter V. Having provided a concise formulation of the argument, we consider the motivation for each premise, drawing on Brian Leftow’s work on Ordinary Sensory Imagination and Kris McDaniel’s account of the analogy of being. We argue that since Bonaventure’s argument is consistent with a strong doctrine of divine ineffability, it is well placed to avoid Aquinas’ criticisms. Equally, Bonaventure’s background metaphysical commitments and epistemology of being afford him a way of arguing that his preferred description of God has an extramental referent. Although Bonaventure’s argument may be criticized at various stages, we conclude that it deserves further attention from Thomists and analytic philosophers alike.