<p>This paper examines how property division rules upon divorce impact marriage matching by socioeconomic status (SES) among newly married couples in China. Leveraging a legal reform as a quasi-natural experiment and data from a repeated cross-sectional national survey, we apply a generalized difference-in-differences analysis. The results show that shifting from equitable division to title-based division reduces the likelihood of marriages where the wife has higher educational attainment than the husband, increases matches with similar educational levels, and raises the likelihood of marriages where the husband has a more prestigious occupation. These effects are most pronounced for women with relatively low SES. We suggest that changes in attitudes toward marriage and gender roles are key mechanisms driving these outcomes. The findings highlight how laws and policies that affect household bargaining power influence not only resource allocation within households but also the choices made during the process of forming households.</p>

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The effect of property division upon divorce on matching by socioeconomic status: Evidence from China

  • Xiangshi Liu,
  • Yiru Wang

摘要

This paper examines how property division rules upon divorce impact marriage matching by socioeconomic status (SES) among newly married couples in China. Leveraging a legal reform as a quasi-natural experiment and data from a repeated cross-sectional national survey, we apply a generalized difference-in-differences analysis. The results show that shifting from equitable division to title-based division reduces the likelihood of marriages where the wife has higher educational attainment than the husband, increases matches with similar educational levels, and raises the likelihood of marriages where the husband has a more prestigious occupation. These effects are most pronounced for women with relatively low SES. We suggest that changes in attitudes toward marriage and gender roles are key mechanisms driving these outcomes. The findings highlight how laws and policies that affect household bargaining power influence not only resource allocation within households but also the choices made during the process of forming households.