<p>This study examines the duration of cartels in India, with a particular focus on the roles of political connections and organizational characteristics. Using a Cox proportional hazards (PH) model, the study analyzes a dataset of 86 cartels prosecuted by the Competition Commission of India (CCI) between 2009 and 2022. The predictors of cartel duration are categorized into three main groups: cartel characteristics, organizational characteristics, and the macroeconomic environment. The findings indicate that cartels with political connections are associated with significantly greater stability, consistent with the existing literature on lobbying and collusion, which suggests that political influence may reduce penalties and enhance cartel survival. Internal organizational characteristics, such as a dominant post-agreement market share and regular information sharing among members, are significantly associated with greater cartel stability. A competing risks hazard model is also used to distinguish between two causes of cartel death: natural death and antitrust intervention. The results indicate that highly organized cartels and cartels with political connections have a lower estimated hazard of natural death. This study contributes to the literature by being the first to empirically assess cartel duration in India and sheds light on the intricate relationship between political connections, organizational characteristics, and cartel stability.</p>