<p>This paper advances a Huttian rebuttal to the narrative of the “specialization trap,” which posits that specialization creates unhedgeable occupational risks by eroding skill generality. Drawing on W. H. Hutt’s theories of consumer sovereignty, idle resources, and the strike-threat system, we contend that the perceived “trap” is a misinterpretation of market coordination and is primarily an artifact of institutional friction rather than an inherent defect of the division of labor. We first argue that specialization is a proactive investment by workers, as entrepreneurs of their own human capital, to satisfy dynamic consumer preferences. Through the wage contract, workers already hedge career downside risks by shifting them to capitalists in exchange for stability. Furthermore, we reframe specialized unemployment not as a structural failure, but as a period of entrepreneurial “prospecting,” providing a service of “availability” to ensure resources are allocated to their highest-valued use; skill updating is analogously reframed as capital maintenance. Finally, we demonstrate that the vulnerability of specialized workers stems from institutional fences—wage rigidities and entry barriers maintained by the strike-threat system—that paralyze market fluidity. We conclude that true security for the specialized laborer lies not in a retreat toward genericism, but in the removal of institutional obstacles to dynamic adjustment.</p>