<p>The current study examines the influence of stewards on accounting manipulation, specifically focusing on the roles of management controllers, corporate governance, and public financial accountability. Furthermore, the study examines the moderating role of accounting capacity in shaping these relationships. The study empirically tests the research model and proposed hypotheses using structural equation modeling. The analysis is based on data collected from practicing professional accountants affiliated with the industry. The results indicate that the controller’s role in management, corporate governance, and public financial accountability has a positive influence on accounting manipulation. The findings reveal a negative relationship between accounting capacity and accounting manipulations; however, its dual moderating role strengthens corporate governance (positive moderation) while weakening public financial accountability (negative moderation). Current research extends the Stewardship Theory by suggesting that management controllers, typically perceived as stewards, may facilitate accounting manipulation when corporate governance and accountability are ineffective. It emphasizes the dual role of accounting capacity, noting that it can either strengthen or fail to prevent manipulation, depending on its design and enforcement. The study examines the motivation for accounting manipulation, ultimately contributing to organizational control and corporate governance mechanisms. The research suggests that a balanced governance and accountability approach is essential to maintain integrity. Current research has limitations due to its reliance on self-reported data, gender imbalance, concerns about generalizability, and the fluctuating moderating impacts of accounting capacity, necessitating additional qualitative and cross-national investigations. The study offers novel insights by demonstrating how controllers’ roles in management, governance, and accountability interrelate, presenting accounting capacity as a means to strengthen governance, concurrently weakening accountability, thereby permitting controllers to contribute to accounting manipulations.</p>

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Engineering accounting manipulation: assessing the role of management controller, corporate governance, and accountability with accounting capacity as a strategic moderator

  • Adeel Qaiser,
  • Alia Ahmed

摘要

The current study examines the influence of stewards on accounting manipulation, specifically focusing on the roles of management controllers, corporate governance, and public financial accountability. Furthermore, the study examines the moderating role of accounting capacity in shaping these relationships. The study empirically tests the research model and proposed hypotheses using structural equation modeling. The analysis is based on data collected from practicing professional accountants affiliated with the industry. The results indicate that the controller’s role in management, corporate governance, and public financial accountability has a positive influence on accounting manipulation. The findings reveal a negative relationship between accounting capacity and accounting manipulations; however, its dual moderating role strengthens corporate governance (positive moderation) while weakening public financial accountability (negative moderation). Current research extends the Stewardship Theory by suggesting that management controllers, typically perceived as stewards, may facilitate accounting manipulation when corporate governance and accountability are ineffective. It emphasizes the dual role of accounting capacity, noting that it can either strengthen or fail to prevent manipulation, depending on its design and enforcement. The study examines the motivation for accounting manipulation, ultimately contributing to organizational control and corporate governance mechanisms. The research suggests that a balanced governance and accountability approach is essential to maintain integrity. Current research has limitations due to its reliance on self-reported data, gender imbalance, concerns about generalizability, and the fluctuating moderating impacts of accounting capacity, necessitating additional qualitative and cross-national investigations. The study offers novel insights by demonstrating how controllers’ roles in management, governance, and accountability interrelate, presenting accounting capacity as a means to strengthen governance, concurrently weakening accountability, thereby permitting controllers to contribute to accounting manipulations.