<p>Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) develops reliable communication under noisy channels into reliable and secure communication under noisy and eavesdropping channels. In quantum information processing, coherent states are widely employed due to their integration advantages in practical applications. In this paper, we propose a continuous-variable (CV) QSDC protocol based on Gaussian-modulated coherent states and guarantee its information-theoretic security through the principles of quantum physics. With respect to the boundary quantization of sensing eavesdropping, we formulate the metrics of total noise with superposition property and establish the security threshold under the trusted channel model, which provides a quantitative standard for checking eavesdropping in practical communications. The theoretical security of the protocol in the asymptotic regime is also quantified, which provides a method for the performance analysis of the entire communication system. In the experiment, a beam splitter attack is used to simulate eavesdropping behavior and the results show the effectiveness of eavesdropping detection.</p>

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Gaussian-modulated coherent-state quantum secure direct communication and its security analysis

  • Lei Wang,
  • Geng Chai,
  • Zhengwen Cao,
  • Xinlei Chen,
  • Kexin Liang

摘要

Quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) develops reliable communication under noisy channels into reliable and secure communication under noisy and eavesdropping channels. In quantum information processing, coherent states are widely employed due to their integration advantages in practical applications. In this paper, we propose a continuous-variable (CV) QSDC protocol based on Gaussian-modulated coherent states and guarantee its information-theoretic security through the principles of quantum physics. With respect to the boundary quantization of sensing eavesdropping, we formulate the metrics of total noise with superposition property and establish the security threshold under the trusted channel model, which provides a quantitative standard for checking eavesdropping in practical communications. The theoretical security of the protocol in the asymptotic regime is also quantified, which provides a method for the performance analysis of the entire communication system. In the experiment, a beam splitter attack is used to simulate eavesdropping behavior and the results show the effectiveness of eavesdropping detection.