<p>Political agency models predict that officials with higher continuation values of office exert greater effort when observable performance is tied to career rewards. We test this prediction in China’s top-down cadre system, where the 2012 leadership reshuffle following the 18th Chinese Communist Party Congress coincided with the elevation of PM_2.5 reduction to an explicit cadre-evaluation criterion. Using data from Chinese prefecture-level cities between 2008 and 2015, we implement a difference-in-differences design comparing cities led by first-term and reappointed leaders. We find that post-2012, first-term leaders achieved larger PM_2.5 reductions than reappointed leaders. This gap reflects first-term leaders’ longer career horizons and weaker pre-existing capture relationships with incumbent polluters. Consistent with multitask incentive theory, first-term leaders exert greater effort on measurable, fast-acting administrative instruments such as production restrictions, while green subsidies and technological innovation show no significant term-stage difference. The paper provides new evidence on political agency, regulatory capture, and multitask incentives in top-down bureaucratic systems.</p>