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<p>Political coercion directed against non-state moralities can serve as a tool for generating legitimacy. Does the efficacy of political coercion in producing legitimacy vary with its intensity? Using Freedom House, V-Dem, and Polity5 indices as proxies for coercive intensity, together with data on regime legitimacy and survival, we find that a mid-level range of coercion is ineffective in generating legitimacy. Relatively few regimes operate in this intermediate zone, and those that do exhibit lower legitimacy and higher instability risks. In contrast, shifts away from this suboptimal range-toward either higher or lower coercion levels-correlate significantly with gains in legitimacy. Time-series analysis of authoritarian regimes reveals a recurring pattern: gradual reductions in coercion that drift into this inefficient mid-range, followed by sharp increases. This dynamic suggests that coercion carries substantial exogenous costs such as economic and reputational costs and that delayed feedback on its legitimacy effects produces overshooting. Drawing on historical cases such as the USSR, we argue that moderate coercion proves inefficient due to an intrinsic negative reaction to coercion, or coercion resentment.</p>

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The inefficiency of moderate political coercion: a cross-country comparison of coercion intensity, state legitimacy, and regime stability

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月2日

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  • Øivind Schøyen,
  • Espen Sirnes,
  • Chris Rune Andersen

摘要

Political coercion directed against non-state moralities can serve as a tool for generating legitimacy. Does the efficacy of political coercion in producing legitimacy vary with its intensity? Using Freedom House, V-Dem, and Polity5 indices as proxies for coercive intensity, together with data on regime legitimacy and survival, we find that a mid-level range of coercion is ineffective in generating legitimacy. Relatively few regimes operate in this intermediate zone, and those that do exhibit lower legitimacy and higher instability risks. In contrast, shifts away from this suboptimal range-toward either higher or lower coercion levels-correlate significantly with gains in legitimacy. Time-series analysis of authoritarian regimes reveals a recurring pattern: gradual reductions in coercion that drift into this inefficient mid-range, followed by sharp increases. This dynamic suggests that coercion carries substantial exogenous costs such as economic and reputational costs and that delayed feedback on its legitimacy effects produces overshooting. Drawing on historical cases such as the USSR, we argue that moderate coercion proves inefficient due to an intrinsic negative reaction to coercion, or coercion resentment.