<p>In 2016, the world became aware of the Chinese Communist Party’s repressive campaign against the Muslim Uyghur populace of China’s far west Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, under which upwards of one million Uyghurs have been detained in reeducation and forced labor camps. This paper investigates the extent to which a country’s religious affiliation plays a role in affecting trade volumes with regimes abroad that implement repressive policies against members of their own religion. Using international trade data from 2010–2019, we employ matching and difference-in-difference methods to estimate the effect of China’s repressive domestic policies on trade volumes with Islamic countries, utilizing countries with a majority Muslim population as our baseline treatment group. Controlling for other measures of economic activity, trade policies, and political institutions, our baseline post-treatment effects on Chinese trade volumes with Islamic countries reveal little to no evidence of blowback against China in the form of reduced exports to (or imports from) China (as a percentage of GDP). We discuss how this episode reveals the collective action problem in organizing effective commercial retaliation on an international scale.</p>

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Repression and international trade: an analysis of Chinese trade volumes with Islamic countries

  • Justin T. Callais,
  • Gregory W. Caskey,
  • Linan Peng

摘要

In 2016, the world became aware of the Chinese Communist Party’s repressive campaign against the Muslim Uyghur populace of China’s far west Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region, under which upwards of one million Uyghurs have been detained in reeducation and forced labor camps. This paper investigates the extent to which a country’s religious affiliation plays a role in affecting trade volumes with regimes abroad that implement repressive policies against members of their own religion. Using international trade data from 2010–2019, we employ matching and difference-in-difference methods to estimate the effect of China’s repressive domestic policies on trade volumes with Islamic countries, utilizing countries with a majority Muslim population as our baseline treatment group. Controlling for other measures of economic activity, trade policies, and political institutions, our baseline post-treatment effects on Chinese trade volumes with Islamic countries reveal little to no evidence of blowback against China in the form of reduced exports to (or imports from) China (as a percentage of GDP). We discuss how this episode reveals the collective action problem in organizing effective commercial retaliation on an international scale.