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<p>We consider a playing-the-field model of a large population Tullock contest. The prize in the Tullock contest is fixed and is, hence, interpreted as rent. Agents’ preferences may be altruistic or spiteful depending on whether they weigh the negative externality they generate positively or negatively. We consider the evolution of such preferences under the class of evolutionary dynamics that satisfy monotone percentage growth rate. We show that such preference evolution eliminates all altruistic and spiteful agents. Only individualistic preferences survive. Agents play the standard Nash equilibrium of a large population Tullock contest at those preferences. The inequality associated with that Nash equilibrium becomes the inequality norm.</p>

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An evolutionary model of rent-seeking and inequality norms in a Tullock contest

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年12月9日

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  • Ratul Lahkar

摘要

We consider a playing-the-field model of a large population Tullock contest. The prize in the Tullock contest is fixed and is, hence, interpreted as rent. Agents’ preferences may be altruistic or spiteful depending on whether they weigh the negative externality they generate positively or negatively. We consider the evolution of such preferences under the class of evolutionary dynamics that satisfy monotone percentage growth rate. We show that such preference evolution eliminates all altruistic and spiteful agents. Only individualistic preferences survive. Agents play the standard Nash equilibrium of a large population Tullock contest at those preferences. The inequality associated with that Nash equilibrium becomes the inequality norm.