Do Accrual Standards Curb Corruption? Evidence on IPSAS Adoption in Developing Economies
摘要
Whether accrual-oriented public sector reporting constrains or enables corruption remains an empirical question in developing and emerging economies. This study examines the association between International Public Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) adoption and corruption using a multi-country panel and dynamic System-GMM specifications. Corruption is proxied by reverse-coded versions of the Corruption Perceptions Index and the World Bank “Control of Corruption” indicator to enhance construct validity. Results indicate a robust negative relationship between IPSAS adoption and perceived corruption, consistent with transparency-as-deterrence mechanisms. The association strengthens with full-accrual implementation and with years of IPSAS experience, suggesting learning effects and deeper institutionalisation. Estimates remain stable after accounting for macro-institutional factors and for globalisation of accounting (adoption of IFRS/IFRS-SMEs/ISA), indicating that IPSAS is not merely proxying for broader reporting ecosystems. Interaction analyses show larger integrity gains in higher-government-effectiveness settings, yet benefits persist on average even in lower-capacity settings. Sub-sample contrasts confirm that full-accrual adopters exhibit lower corruption relative to both cash-basis adopters and non-adopters. Overall, the evidence supports IPSAS as an additional integrity mechanism when accompanied by capability, enforcement, and sustained use of accrual information. Policy implications emphasise quality-assured, sequenced adoption; investment in systems and skills; and tighter governance of accrual judgments to minimise opportunistic measurement.