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<p>In discussions of mind–body dualism, the focus has been on the patterns of causation it would require (the problem, for example, of nomological danglers). Much less attention has been paid to dualism’s view of the nature of the relation between persons and their bodies. I will defend dualism from two sorts of criticisms: (1) that it makes the person’s relation to his body like that of a pilot’s to his ship; (2) that it can’t give any acceptable account of the interaction between mind and body. I use Descartes and Peter Van Inwagen as convenient hooks for my defense. I consider the&#xa0;relation&#xa0;between epistemological and metaphysical considerations that both philosophers raise and argue for a lack of connection between those two sets of considerations. I also argue that the interaction problem for dualism is a pseudo-problem and results only from a mistaken view of the location requirements for causation.</p>

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Persons and their bodies

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月11日

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  • David-Hillel Ruben

摘要

In discussions of mind–body dualism, the focus has been on the patterns of causation it would require (the problem, for example, of nomological danglers). Much less attention has been paid to dualism’s view of the nature of the relation between persons and their bodies. I will defend dualism from two sorts of criticisms: (1) that it makes the person’s relation to his body like that of a pilot’s to his ship; (2) that it can’t give any acceptable account of the interaction between mind and body. I use Descartes and Peter Van Inwagen as convenient hooks for my defense. I consider the relation between epistemological and metaphysical considerations that both philosophers raise and argue for a lack of connection between those two sets of considerations. I also argue that the interaction problem for dualism is a pseudo-problem and results only from a mistaken view of the location requirements for causation.