<p>Agent-causal libertarianism is the view that agents-qua-agents, rather than being determined by external factors beyond their control, can choose for themselves, among various possibilities, how they will act. Numerous philosophers yoke their agent-causal libertarianism with an emergentist metaphysic, according to which nature is mereologically layered such that novel wholes emerge from, and causally influence, the parts constituting them. In this paper I present an emergentist model of agent causal libertarianism, according to which agents as emergent wholes of higher-level parts such as reasons, desires and choices, arise out of and causally influence, their lower-level neural parts. I then compare and contrast this model with two other contemporary agent-causal emergentist models, one from Timothy O’Connor, the other from Juan Morales. After arguing that my model is preferable in several respects to these models, I consider a leading concern with all forms of emergentism, namely, outlining how it integrates with the doctrine of physicalism.</p>