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<p>Recently, many epistemologists have proposed instrumental norms of inquiry, that is, norms that concern taking means to answer the questions we are pursuing. But which questions should we pursue in the first place, and why? In this paper, I offer a novel defense of the radical pragmatist view, according to which there are no epistemic norms of inquiry, and all reasons to pursue questions and take means to answering them&#xa0;are practical.&#xa0;This includes reasons linked with the intrinsic or prudential value of cognitive goods like knowledge or understanding. We can confirm this by observing that fitting reactions to failure to respond to such reasons are practical rather than epistemic in nature (e.g. pity rather than epistemic downgrading).&#xa0;Given that reasons don’t transubstantiate when they are transmitted,&#xa0;any instrumental ‘zetetic’ reasons to take means to answer questions are practical as well. All of the above is nevertheless compatible with granting that some ways of inquiring do merit epistemic criticism. But that’s not because they violate some specifically zetetic epistemic norm, but because they are based on means-end beliefs that don’t constitute knowledge or lack justification, and thus entail violations of traditional epistemic norms. In the big picture, what this means is that the part of epistemology that concerns norms of inquiry overlaps with value theory and theory of practical rationality.</p>

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Reasons for questions and the norms of inquiry

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月29日

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  • Antti Kauppinen

摘要

Recently, many epistemologists have proposed instrumental norms of inquiry, that is, norms that concern taking means to answer the questions we are pursuing. But which questions should we pursue in the first place, and why? In this paper, I offer a novel defense of the radical pragmatist view, according to which there are no epistemic norms of inquiry, and all reasons to pursue questions and take means to answering them are practical. This includes reasons linked with the intrinsic or prudential value of cognitive goods like knowledge or understanding. We can confirm this by observing that fitting reactions to failure to respond to such reasons are practical rather than epistemic in nature (e.g. pity rather than epistemic downgrading). Given that reasons don’t transubstantiate when they are transmitted, any instrumental ‘zetetic’ reasons to take means to answer questions are practical as well. All of the above is nevertheless compatible with granting that some ways of inquiring do merit epistemic criticism. But that’s not because they violate some specifically zetetic epistemic norm, but because they are based on means-end beliefs that don’t constitute knowledge or lack justification, and thus entail violations of traditional epistemic norms. In the big picture, what this means is that the part of epistemology that concerns norms of inquiry overlaps with value theory and theory of practical rationality.