<p>Which is more fundamental: monadic value properties (“degrees of value”) possessed by individual valuable entities, or dyadic value relations (betterness, equality, etc) <i>between</i> valuable entities? This question parallels a hotly contested question about the metaphysics of physical quantities like mass, between “absolutists” (who prioritize monadic properties) and “comparativists” (who prioritize comparative relations). This paper does two things. First, I make a case for absolutism with respect to value, centered on the argument that only absolutism can make sense of cross-world value comparisons, and that such comparisons are essential to the action-guiding role of value. Second, I argue that the metaphysical question of value absolutism vs comparativism has substantive implications for axiology: in particular, absolutism weakens the connection between “individualism” (the idea that individual welfare subjects are the fundamental bearers of value) and principles like Pareto that tie value comparisons between worlds directly to individual-by-individual comparisons.</p>