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<p>Sometimes, a normative reason in favor of an action is <i>moral</i>, such as that the action would save a stranger from death; other reasons appear not to be moral, such as that the action would save me some money. This paper develops a novel account of what distinguishes moral reasons from other, nonmoral normative reasons for action. On the <i>joint deliberation theory</i> I propose, what makes reasons moral is that they apply not only within one’s individual practical deliberation, but also within a perspective of joint practical deliberation one can take up together with all other persons. After unpacking what it means for a reason to apply within joint deliberation, I argue that the joint deliberation theory promises a non-circular, satisfying explanation of why moral reasons have their distinctive content and implications for moral obligation and fitting accountability.</p>

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What makes reasons moral?

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年6月20日

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  • Brendan de Kenessey

摘要

Sometimes, a normative reason in favor of an action is moral, such as that the action would save a stranger from death; other reasons appear not to be moral, such as that the action would save me some money. This paper develops a novel account of what distinguishes moral reasons from other, nonmoral normative reasons for action. On the joint deliberation theory I propose, what makes reasons moral is that they apply not only within one’s individual practical deliberation, but also within a perspective of joint practical deliberation one can take up together with all other persons. After unpacking what it means for a reason to apply within joint deliberation, I argue that the joint deliberation theory promises a non-circular, satisfying explanation of why moral reasons have their distinctive content and implications for moral obligation and fitting accountability.