<p>A multi-disciplinary body of research has long recognised trust as a pivotal feature of social and economic exchange. Empirical studies of trust by psychologists, sociologists, political scientists, and economists have examined different features of trust. Within this literature, the structure, components, preconditions, and implications of trust have received much attention. However, a question that has received comparatively little attention in the empirical literature is whether and to what extent trust is morally significant. Moral dimensions of trust have been discussed extensively by philosophers, who focus predominantly on interpersonal relationships involving trust. The purpose of this paper is to offer an experimental study of a dominant philosophical distinction between trust and mere reliance. Our findings suggest that the position taken in the philosophical literature is correct; there is a recognisable difference between trust and mere reliance, and, crucially, trust, but not reliance, has a moral dimension. These findings have significant implications for the existing body of empirical work on trust outside philosophy. They also help set the philosophy of trust subfield onto firm(er) foundations.</p>