<p>This paper is about the overlooked topic of how the content of remembering changes in the course of the temporally unfolding mental action of remembering. The main claim is that what is distinctive about remembering as a mental act is not the kind of content it has, but rather how such content changes as the act of remembering unfolds. More specifically, remembering increases – or tries to increase – the determinacy of the content of memory. When I am trying to remember what I had for breakfast yesterday morning, this remembering means that I am trying to make the content of my memory of yesterday’s breakfast more determinate. This either succeeds or it doesn’t. This is a sharp contrast with the way increasing the determinacy of content works in the case of other mental states. An important consequence of thinking about the content of remembering this way is that it can help us not only to explain the difference between misremembering and confabulation, but also to reframe the debate about the difference between remembering and imagining.</p>