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<p>Our actions are guided by, and thus partially explained by, our perceptions. Accordingly, theories of perceptual content must be compatible with action explanations. It is commonly assumed that the dominant view, which holds that perceptual representations include <i>de se</i> (first-personal) content, readily supports such explanations. More recently, a simpler alternative has been proposed: that perceptual representations carry mere indexical locational content that refers to a location, that occupied by the perceiver. Proponents of this view contend that it, too, can be used in explanations of action. In this paper, I argue that both views capture something essential that the other neglects. <i>De se</i> content is well-suited to explain the motivational aspect of action, while indexical locational content can explain the coordination between perception and action. Yet taken individually, each view faces explanatory challenges. To address these, I propose the Located Individual View, which holds that perceptual representations include both <i>de se</i> and indexical locational contents. I contend that this hybrid account can best explain how perception both motivates and guides action.</p>

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Locating the self: Indexicals in perception and action

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年7月11日

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  • Catherine Hochman

摘要

Our actions are guided by, and thus partially explained by, our perceptions. Accordingly, theories of perceptual content must be compatible with action explanations. It is commonly assumed that the dominant view, which holds that perceptual representations include de se (first-personal) content, readily supports such explanations. More recently, a simpler alternative has been proposed: that perceptual representations carry mere indexical locational content that refers to a location, that occupied by the perceiver. Proponents of this view contend that it, too, can be used in explanations of action. In this paper, I argue that both views capture something essential that the other neglects. De se content is well-suited to explain the motivational aspect of action, while indexical locational content can explain the coordination between perception and action. Yet taken individually, each view faces explanatory challenges. To address these, I propose the Located Individual View, which holds that perceptual representations include both de se and indexical locational contents. I contend that this hybrid account can best explain how perception both motivates and guides action.