<p>There are good reasons to think that all experiences are temporally extended. For example, the physical correlates of experiences are all temporally extended, and the phenomenology of duration and change suggests temporal extendedness. However, David Builes and Michele Odissea Impagnatiello (forthcoming) argue that if all experiences are temporally extended, and some other very plausible premises hold, then each of us has been conscious forever, infinitely into the past. Thus, we have a dilemma: Give up the well-motivated claim that all experiences are temporally extended, or accept the absurd conclusion that we’ve all been conscious forever. In this paper, I chart a course through the horns of this dilemma by introducing and defending a view of consciousness—the “Tapestry View”—that allows us to maintain that all experiences are temporally extended without implying that we’ve been conscious infinitely into the past. It’s important to have a theory that doesn’t imply that we’ve been conscious forever, but defanging Builes and Impagnatiello’s argument isn’t my ultimate ambition. It’s to introduce, develop, and defend a novel view about the temporal nature of consciousness.</p>