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<p>Philosophical accounts of disagreements within logic tend to focus on how <i>logics</i> themselves disagree with one another, such as how their theorems or (meta)inferences diverge, while neglecting the theoretical disagreements that lead to the advocacy of these logics. This has several shortcomings, amongst which it fails to explain why disagreements over the correct logic occur in the first place, as well as overlooking the possibility of substantive logical disagreements amongst those who advocate the same logic. In this paper, we move the debate away from this <i>lawcentrism</i>, highlighting the various ways in which <i>logicians</i> disagree with each other when engaged in theory choice. We propose a framework of <i>logical research programs</i> within which to understand the distinct commitments logicians take on when engaged in theory choice, and show how a range of existent disagreements amongst logicians can be fruitfully understood in terms of disagreements between elements of their respective research programs.</p>

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How logic(ian)s disagree

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年3月7日

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  • Franci Mangraviti,
  • Ben Martin

摘要

Philosophical accounts of disagreements within logic tend to focus on how logics themselves disagree with one another, such as how their theorems or (meta)inferences diverge, while neglecting the theoretical disagreements that lead to the advocacy of these logics. This has several shortcomings, amongst which it fails to explain why disagreements over the correct logic occur in the first place, as well as overlooking the possibility of substantive logical disagreements amongst those who advocate the same logic. In this paper, we move the debate away from this lawcentrism, highlighting the various ways in which logicians disagree with each other when engaged in theory choice. We propose a framework of logical research programs within which to understand the distinct commitments logicians take on when engaged in theory choice, and show how a range of existent disagreements amongst logicians can be fruitfully understood in terms of disagreements between elements of their respective research programs.