The Cogito and sums
摘要
Eliminativist microphysical nihilism (EMN) is the view that there are many submicroscopic simples but no other material objects, and neither you nor I nor any ordinary objects exist. I defend a Cogito-based argument against EMN: (1) I am conscious; (2) if so, then I exist; therefore (3) I exist. I address those who deny (1) but concede that some surrogate is certain. The surrogates I consider include: 〈if all the simples were just as they actually are but these simples composed something, I would be conscious〉, 〈some things are collectively conscious〉, 〈there is an experience〉, 〈this is an experience›, and 〈these are collectively conscious〉. I offer an abductive argument for the view, Cartesianism, that (1) itself is certain. I specify four logically complex propositions about consciousness that everyone should take to be certain, and I argue that Cartesianism better explains the certainty of these four propositions than do its EMN-friendly alternatives. I call the argument the Abductive Meta-Cogito.