<p>A variety of widely-held epistemological theories are committed to one or more of the following theses: that you objectively epistemically ought to believe all and only truths, or have maximally accurate credences; that the epistemic value of a person’s beliefs is determined by their distance from the truth; and that rationality roughly consists in minimizing this distance to the extent possible, given one’s limited information. These commitments form the foundation of accuracy-based epistemology and veritist epistemology generally. This paper focuses on the first claim. Call this the ‘<span>truth norm</span>.’ This paper argues against the <span>truth norm</span>. The norm is open to a variety of interpretations, and each interpretation, once made precise, yields unacceptable verdicts about what we ought to believe. The worries I raise concern higher-order beliefs. Many epistemologists presuppose that puzzles generated by higher-order beliefs can be quarantined off, or idealized away, without impugning broad epistemological theories. One lesson of this paper: higher-orderdom is <i>infectious</i>. It pervades more of our beliefs—beliefs that matter to us—than is generally acknowledged. This fact will create problems for the <span>truth norm</span> and for many truth- and accuracy-based theories of epistemic rationality.</p>