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<p>When it comes to philosophical discussions of normativity, manners, etiquette, protocol, and the like seem to play “third fiddle" (at best) behind more significant norms of morality, prudence, and so on. On its face, however, this fact should strike us as surprising. For many parents, the first behavioral lessons provided to children involves what is rude and what is polite. When traveling to a foreign nation, we are concerned to “do what’s done", and not to commit <i>faux pas</i>. When meeting with dignitaries or VIPs, it is essential that we conform to the basic rules of protocol in matters of formal address. But recently, moral philosophers have been reconsidering manners as an important source of normativity. Most significantly, Sarah Buss and Karen Stohr have argued that manners has a crucial moral function; when we behave rudely we behave in ways we have strong moral reasons to avoid. In this paper, I argue this trend is laudable but mistaken. To assimilate concern for manners into moral concern is to make a mess of both manners and morality.</p>

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Doing what’s done: manners, morality, and practical reason

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年7月26日

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  • Dale Dorsey

摘要

When it comes to philosophical discussions of normativity, manners, etiquette, protocol, and the like seem to play “third fiddle" (at best) behind more significant norms of morality, prudence, and so on. On its face, however, this fact should strike us as surprising. For many parents, the first behavioral lessons provided to children involves what is rude and what is polite. When traveling to a foreign nation, we are concerned to “do what’s done", and not to commit faux pas. When meeting with dignitaries or VIPs, it is essential that we conform to the basic rules of protocol in matters of formal address. But recently, moral philosophers have been reconsidering manners as an important source of normativity. Most significantly, Sarah Buss and Karen Stohr have argued that manners has a crucial moral function; when we behave rudely we behave in ways we have strong moral reasons to avoid. In this paper, I argue this trend is laudable but mistaken. To assimilate concern for manners into moral concern is to make a mess of both manners and morality.