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<p>I take some initial steps toward a theory of real definition, drawing upon recent developments in higher-order logic. The resulting account allows for extremely fine-grained distinctions (it can distinguish between any relata that differ in their syntactic structure, while avoiding the Russell-Myhill problem). It is the first account that can consistently embrace three desirable logical principles that initially appear to be incompatible: the <i>Identification Hypothesis</i> (if <i>F</i> is, by definition, <i>G</i>, then there is a sense in which <i>F</i> is the same as <i>G</i>), <i>Irreflexivity</i> (there are no reflexive definitions), and <i>Leibniz’s Law</i>. Additionally, it possesses the resources needed to resolve the paradox of analysis.</p>

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Definition by proxy

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年2月8日

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  • Samuel Z. Elgin

摘要

I take some initial steps toward a theory of real definition, drawing upon recent developments in higher-order logic. The resulting account allows for extremely fine-grained distinctions (it can distinguish between any relata that differ in their syntactic structure, while avoiding the Russell-Myhill problem). It is the first account that can consistently embrace three desirable logical principles that initially appear to be incompatible: the Identification Hypothesis (if F is, by definition, G, then there is a sense in which F is the same as G), Irreflexivity (there are no reflexive definitions), and Leibniz’s Law. Additionally, it possesses the resources needed to resolve the paradox of analysis.