<p>I argue that Goffin’s cockatoos are individual innovators: they arrive at novel solutions to some practical problems in thought. Drawing on empirical studies of tool fabrication and use, I defend this claim by ruling out cognitively deflationary alternatives, with particular focus on teleofunctionalist accounts. I then explore what kind of cognition would support such innovation and argue that a minimal form of self-consciousness—nonconceptual self-representation—likely plays a role. By drawing on phenomenological work on the role of the body in cognition—and, especially, in imagination—I suggest that the tool use requires the agent to keep track of its body as its own across thoughts tied to the here-and-now and thoughts about possibilities. On this basis, I draw three broader conclusions. First, the cockatoo case illustrates a transition point where 'revisionary', evolutionary accounts of agency begin to break down and 'classical', thought-involving explanations become necessary. Second, it suggests a novel perspective on the natural origins of self-consciousness: that self-consciousness may emerge in nature to enable the integration of prospective thought about ways the world could be with thoughts tied to how things currently are. Third, it opposes a popular binary distinction between humans and animals, according to which animals are essentially bound to the here-and-now, while humans are not.</p>