<p>Autism is frequently characterized as involving bodily phenomena that diverge from those experienced by neurotypical individuals, from those neurotypical individuals, and prevailing explanations continue to attribute these differences primarily to functional impairments of the subject. Drawing on a phenomenological first-person perspective, this paper critically examines three dominant research frameworks and proposes an enactive account of autistic body-consciousness grounded in the relational structure of subjectivity–body–environment. By analyzing the roles of subjectivity, the body, and the environment in the generation of body-consciousness, we emphasize that (1) all three elements function as equally indispensable constituents; and (2) the relation between each element and body-consciousness is neither unidirectional nor a fixed causal correlation, but rather, the generation of body-consciousness of autistic individuals is determined by the overall relationship of subjectivity-body-environment. From this perspective, the distinctive bodily experiences of autistic individuals are better understood as reflecting differences in relational adaptability, rather than deficits or impairments located in any single element. In particular, situations that readily afford aligned adaptability for neurotypical individuals may remain misaligned for autistic individuals. Finally, from the enactive and relational explanation and ethics of neurodiversity, we offer several macro-level recommendations for rethinking support practices for autistic individuals.</p>