<p>Sometimes, especially in familiar tool use, our intentions concern only distal effects on external objects, not our bodily movements. Yet we still succeed in selecting the appropriate bodily movements. How is this possible? This question relates to the interface problem in the philosophy of mind and action, which asks how intentions and motor representations—each with distinct representational formats—coordinate. Although our question is not its main focus, many proposed solutions to the interface problem imply that bodily movements must be represented in intention in order to be selected. If so, they cannot explain the phenomenon at hand—and thus cannot offer a satisfactory answer to the question of how intentions control the body. I argue that research on the ideomotor principle suggests an alternative route: intentions can give rise to imagery of the effects that bodily movements produce on external objects, and such imagery can in turn trigger the appropriate motor representations. Because this pathway allows representations of distal effects to mediate between intention and motor systems, it better explains how bodily actions are selected even when they are not represented in intentions. While some may object that this account relies on translation processes—often viewed with suspicion—I will argue that this aversion is unfounded and that such processes need not be rejected.</p>