<p>This article explores the intersection of the Brentanian theory of mind and the Lvov–Warsaw School, focusing on the question of how to understand feelings and acts of volition within Brentano’s classificatory program of mental phenomena. Brentano famously argued in favor of three classes of mental phenomena, i.e., presentations, judgments, and love-and-hate phenomena; the third class encompasses both feelings and the will. Brentano’s arguments in favor of the unitary third class, however, are questionable. They were critically assessed by, among others, Ehrenfels and Twardowski. This article presents a survey and a critical analysis of all three approaches. In particular, Brentano’s arguments are analyzed, followed by their critical assessment formulated by Ehrenfels, including his account of feelings and desires, and Twardowski’s view of the classificatory program. In addition, Twardowski’s idea that desires are based upon feelings is analyzed, and his account of volitions is discussed. Against this background, the article examines to what extent the arguments of Ehrenfels and Twardowski contribute to recent scholarship on the Brentanian theory of mind.</p>