<p>The affective scaffolding framework underlies differing perspectives on how griefbots affect the grieving process. While some researchers are optimistic, others draw more cautious conclusions. We endorse the view that griefbots are affective scaffolds. However, we draw a pessimistic conclusion about human-griefbot interaction. There are two main views on successful grief: the “Freudian view” and the continuing bonds view. The “Freudian view” paves the way to the pessimistic conclusion. In this paper, we propose a free-energy approach of the “Freudian view”. Predictive processing is often regarded as providing a process theory for the free-energy principle. In this framework, model evidence must be maximised by updating and optimising models. Griefbots are not recommendable since they are scaffolds that obstruct and lengthen the maximisation of model evidence, making models more rigid and poorly adaptable to changing dynamics. Building on this approach, we examine the ethical dimensions of griefbot’s use and design. We argue that there is something inherently morally wrong in the very conception of griefbots. Their functionality predisposes them to cause harm by disrupting the grief process.</p>

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

A pessimistic approach to griefbots: free-energy, affective scaffolds, and the ethics of human-griefbot interaction

  • José M. Araya,
  • Gabriela Arriagada-Bruneau

摘要

The affective scaffolding framework underlies differing perspectives on how griefbots affect the grieving process. While some researchers are optimistic, others draw more cautious conclusions. We endorse the view that griefbots are affective scaffolds. However, we draw a pessimistic conclusion about human-griefbot interaction. There are two main views on successful grief: the “Freudian view” and the continuing bonds view. The “Freudian view” paves the way to the pessimistic conclusion. In this paper, we propose a free-energy approach of the “Freudian view”. Predictive processing is often regarded as providing a process theory for the free-energy principle. In this framework, model evidence must be maximised by updating and optimising models. Griefbots are not recommendable since they are scaffolds that obstruct and lengthen the maximisation of model evidence, making models more rigid and poorly adaptable to changing dynamics. Building on this approach, we examine the ethical dimensions of griefbot’s use and design. We argue that there is something inherently morally wrong in the very conception of griefbots. Their functionality predisposes them to cause harm by disrupting the grief process.