<p>Grief-bots present a unique issue for the bereaved. As technology that can mimic the bespoke linguistic dispositions of a recently deceased loved one, grief-bots pose the heightened risk of the bereaved becoming dependent on them. One way to solve this problem is to restrict access to such technology, whether it is in the form of a complete ban, therapist-aided use, or technological limitations. I argue that such restrictions would constitute <i>unjust affective paternalism.</i> Marginalised people have long suffered from widespread failures of trust in their capacity to emotionally self-regulate. Restrictions on the use of such technology, in the name of improving emotional wellbeing, reinforce this system of injustice. In the end, I argue that rather than restrict access to grief-bots, services and government programs should be made available so that anyone who wants to avoid dependency, or overcome it, can access them if they wish.</p>

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Grief-bots and affective paternalism: a case against restriction

  • Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky

摘要

Grief-bots present a unique issue for the bereaved. As technology that can mimic the bespoke linguistic dispositions of a recently deceased loved one, grief-bots pose the heightened risk of the bereaved becoming dependent on them. One way to solve this problem is to restrict access to such technology, whether it is in the form of a complete ban, therapist-aided use, or technological limitations. I argue that such restrictions would constitute unjust affective paternalism. Marginalised people have long suffered from widespread failures of trust in their capacity to emotionally self-regulate. Restrictions on the use of such technology, in the name of improving emotional wellbeing, reinforce this system of injustice. In the end, I argue that rather than restrict access to grief-bots, services and government programs should be made available so that anyone who wants to avoid dependency, or overcome it, can access them if they wish.