<p>This paper examines the relationship between philosophical phenomenology and its application in qualitative educational research, with a specific focus on Edwin Creely’s 2018 article, “Understanding Things from Within”. This analysis accomplishes two goals. First, I engage directly with Creely’s text to present a more careful interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology and its potential role in qualitative research. In doing so, I identify key errors in Creely’s reading of Husserl, mistakes in his methodological application, and shortcomings of his empirical findings. Second, I situate Creely’s misapplication within a broader discussion of why misinterpretations of Husserl’s phenomenology persist in qualitative education research. By using Creely as a case study, I identify underlying reasons for common errors in the application of Husserl’s methods and core concepts. I conclude by pointing to a more viable approach that avoids the methodological and conceptual pitfalls frequently found in Creely’s work and similar studies.</p>

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An introduction to phenomenology in qualitative education research: A critical reading of ‘Understanding things from within’

  • Thomas Byrne

摘要

This paper examines the relationship between philosophical phenomenology and its application in qualitative educational research, with a specific focus on Edwin Creely’s 2018 article, “Understanding Things from Within”. This analysis accomplishes two goals. First, I engage directly with Creely’s text to present a more careful interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology and its potential role in qualitative research. In doing so, I identify key errors in Creely’s reading of Husserl, mistakes in his methodological application, and shortcomings of his empirical findings. Second, I situate Creely’s misapplication within a broader discussion of why misinterpretations of Husserl’s phenomenology persist in qualitative education research. By using Creely as a case study, I identify underlying reasons for common errors in the application of Husserl’s methods and core concepts. I conclude by pointing to a more viable approach that avoids the methodological and conceptual pitfalls frequently found in Creely’s work and similar studies.