Optimizing call option purchasing for perishable emergency supplies through rotation strategies: a stackelberg game approach
摘要
Perishable emergency supplies often face challenges related to insufficient reservations and value loss during storage. To address these issues, we propose establishing rotation points based on how the value decays over the reservation period. This rotation can be integrated into the purchasing process for call options on emergency supplies, effectively tackling the problem of under-reservation. This paper models the interactions between purchasers and suppliers as a Stackelberg game, allowing us to analyze the optimal reservation choices for both parties. We identify the conditions necessary to achieve optimal decisions for both sides. Compared to a call option purchasing model that does not incorporate rotation, our rotation-inclusive model not only reduces the cost of options but also shows through numerical simulations that, under certain conditions, the rotation can lower the government’s storage volume while increasing the overall reserves of both parties. This approach alleviates the reservation pressure on the government and enhances the overall risk resistance of the supply chain.