Influence before hiring: a two-tiered incentive compatible mechanism for IoT-based crowdsourcing in strategic setting
摘要
In crowdsourcing, a group of common people execute the tasks and in return receive incentives. This paper addresses hiring quality IoT devices for task execution in IoT-based crowdsourcing within a strategic setting, assuming devices are initially unaware of the hiring process. Its significance lies in a unified approach that simultaneously ensures awareness creation, quality-based task allocation, truthfulness, and budget feasibility—enhancing participation, reliability, and cost-effectiveness in IoT-driven crowdsourcing environments. First of all, how to make IoT devices aware of task execution process? For this purpose, a Task Execution Notifiers Mechanism (TENM) is proposed, motivated by budget feasible mechanism. Further, the question is how to hire quality IoT devices? For this purpose, the Effective Task Executors Identification mechanism (ECTAI) and the Winners and Price Determination mechanism (WiPD) are designed. Theoretical analysis shows that the proposed mechanisms are computationally efficient, truthful, correct, and budget feasible (only for first tier). The simulation shows that TENM takes approximately 13.262 ms and 17.153 ms more time than NTBFM and Random respectively, and 8.759 ms more time than PSM. ECTAI takes approximately 0.260 ms more time than AVR. WiPD takes 1.920 ms more time than GREEDY and 1.512 ms less time than N. Zhao et al. In terms of utility, ECTAI gives $5.458, and AVR gives $4.890 of gains. It signifies that in ECTAI, the task executors gain $0.568 as compared to AVR. WiPD gives $273.69 and GREEDY gives $230.438 of gains. It signifies that in WiPD the task executors gain $43.252 as compared to GREEDY.