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<p>How do organized scientific interests shape the agenda of science, technology, and innovation (STI) policy in the European Union (EU)? I address this question by investigating how the so-called “CERN for Artificial Intelligence (AI)” initiative, a proposal to organize Europe’s AI research in a CERN-like ecosystem, made it onto the agenda of EU policymakers. Drawing on the interest group as well as agenda-setting scholarship and triangulating data from multiple sources, I argue that the Confederation of Laboratories for AI Research in Europe, a scientific interest group, pushed the initiative onto the EU’s <i>informal</i> (pre-decisional) policy agenda through direct and indirect lobbying. I also demonstrate that CERN for AI has so far failed to enter Brussel’s <i>formal</i> (decision) agenda because of turf battles between organized scientific interests; a lack of experience, resources, and time among its advocates; the fragmentation of EU AI research policy and funding; as well as the initiative’s framing. My findings add to the study of STI policymaking in the EU, which has so far focused on individual policymakers, bureaucrats, or political institutions as policy entrepreneurs while neglecting to study the role of organized scientific interests in STI policy agenda-setting.</p>

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“We Need a CERN for AI”: Organized Scientific Interests and Agenda-Setting in European Science, Technology, and Innovation Policy

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年3月17日

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  • Anna-Lena Rüland

摘要

How do organized scientific interests shape the agenda of science, technology, and innovation (STI) policy in the European Union (EU)? I address this question by investigating how the so-called “CERN for Artificial Intelligence (AI)” initiative, a proposal to organize Europe’s AI research in a CERN-like ecosystem, made it onto the agenda of EU policymakers. Drawing on the interest group as well as agenda-setting scholarship and triangulating data from multiple sources, I argue that the Confederation of Laboratories for AI Research in Europe, a scientific interest group, pushed the initiative onto the EU’s informal (pre-decisional) policy agenda through direct and indirect lobbying. I also demonstrate that CERN for AI has so far failed to enter Brussel’s formal (decision) agenda because of turf battles between organized scientific interests; a lack of experience, resources, and time among its advocates; the fragmentation of EU AI research policy and funding; as well as the initiative’s framing. My findings add to the study of STI policymaking in the EU, which has so far focused on individual policymakers, bureaucrats, or political institutions as policy entrepreneurs while neglecting to study the role of organized scientific interests in STI policy agenda-setting.