<p>This article offers a Hohfeldian analysis of the right to die and asks what follows, normatively and institutionally, once the relevant incidents are distinguished. It argues that debates about assisted dying frequently conflate four questions: whether choosing death is morally permitted (licence), whether others must not interfere with that choice (negative claim-right), whether a valid request can alter others’ normative situation (normative power), and whether anyone owes assistance (positive claim-right). The paper maps major objections to the incident they primarily target and shows that many familiar objections to assisted dying bear most directly on duties of assistance rather than on the underlying permission or the claim against interference. Substantively, it defends a universal moral licence to die and, where competence, voluntariness, and adequate information are satisfied, a corresponding negative claim-right against unjustified interference. Its institutional conclusion is more limited than a direct duty on any particular physician to provide assisted death: what can be justified more securely is a right to make a request that must be assessed under public criteria and, in jurisdictions authorising assisted dying, routed to willing and licensed providers. Separating public validity review from plural provision models, the paper argues, can reduce coercion and conscience-based conflict while preserving access.</p>