<p>Is bioethics a discipline? This question has accompanied the field since its emergence, revealing persistent tensions about what defines a discipline and what bioethics is expected to achieve. This article revisits the debate through the lens of conceptual analysis. While engaging critically with Bjørn Hofmann’s argument—representative of a narrow, method-focused view of disciplinarity—we propose a broader and more dynamic account. In the <i>pars destruens</i>, we show that Hofmann’s criteria rely on an overly restrictive conception of disciplines, one that is inconsistent with current practices. In the <i>pars construens</i>, we adopt Krishnan’s comprehensive framework to demonstrate how bioethics meets six core elements of disciplinarity: a particular object of research, a body of specialized knowledge, structuring theories and concepts, shared terminology and technical language, specific research methods, and institutional manifestations. We argue that bioethics’ pluralism and normative orientation are not signs of epistemic immaturity, but appropriate responses to the complexity of its subject matter. Rather than undermining its status, these features affirm bioethics as a discipline in its own right—one that bridges philosophical reflection and practical engagement in contemporary medicine and healthcare.</p>