<p>In contrast to the early versions of his phenomenological ethics, the concepts of “love” and “personal value” assume an increasingly central role in Husserl’s later ethical reflections. Among the various forms of love, this paper argues that - according to Husserl’s descriptions - generative love functions as the primal institution of personal value. The discussion unfolds in three parts. The first section clarifies the notion of personal value and its intrinsic link to love, and outlines how the question of the primal institution of personal value appears both in Husserl’s own texts and in existing secondary literature. The second part examines this question through the lens of generative love, which essentially exhibits an asymmetrical structure. Drawing on Husserl’s analyses, this structure allows us to understand generative love as the awakening of an ethical subject. The third part then adopts a teleological perspective to reveal the “transcendental” dimension of generative love. Husserl’s conception of personal value clearly displays a teleological tendency. Because the realization of the ultimate ethical aim remains unattainable within a single individual life, generative development offers the hope of approaching ultimate value. Generative love thereby acquires a significance that surpasses individual life and death. Through an analysis of personal value and generative love, this paper shows how Husserl develops a distinct new direction in phenomenology, one that clearly diverges from his earlier concepts.</p>