<p>This paper explicates the concept of an institution of nature, a notion hinted at but never fully developed in Merleau-Ponty’s Collège de France lectures. The study begins by distinguishing institution from sedimentation, arguing for the protean, malleable character of institution as a model for temporality within consciousness, culture, and embodiment. The paper then critically contrasts Descartes’s divine “institution of nature” with Merleau-Ponty’s naturalized alternative, in which nature self-institutes through the autoproduction of sense over deep, evolutionary time. An illustration and proof of concept is the human body, conceived as a primordial institution of nature whose intercorporeality—anatomical, sensory, and affective—grounds higher modes of human intersubjectivity, culture, and language. Through analyses of the intercorporeity of sight, hearing, touch, and affectivity, the paper illustrates how naturally instituted bodily structures both enable and limit culturally elaborated forms of sense-making. Finally, it advocates for an expanded “generative phenomenology” that incorporates evolutionary biology, suggesting that the foundations of human experience, culture, and intersubjectivity are rooted in natural institutions laid down through evolutionary processes. While traditional phenomenology has often remained silent on evolution, the Merleau-Pontian concept of an “institution of nature” offers a promising framework for integrating evolutionary and phenomenological perspectives. This approach bridges phenomenology and the life sciences by embedding the genesis of meaning in both culture and natural evolution.</p>