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<p>In this paper, I argue against a common evaluation of the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion, namely, that it lacks a sufficient place for hermeneutics. This critique, which has been advanced since his early work, puts forward three major objections: (1) by holding givenness as absolute, Marion betrays the phenomenological breakthrough he claims to defend; (2) by recasting the role of the subject as the receptive <i>adonné</i>, he renders the self passive and undermines our freedom in the process of knowing; (3) by placing initiative on the given as arriving from outside our anticipations, Marion refuses any horizon of interpretation, whether history, tradition, culture, language, or practice, even though these things are structurally necessary to our understanding. Against this common view, I will argue that Marion has provided an adequate response to each of these critiques. In Part I, I will discuss the first two objections through Marion’s essay “The Hermeneutics of Givenness.” In Part II, I will extend this discussion to the extremes by considering the radical cases of saturated phenomena, building on <i>Revelation Comes from Elsewhere</i>. Finally, in Part III I will consider the broader hermeneutic horizons of language, culture, and history with a special attention to <i>La métaphysique et après</i>. By bringing to light Marion’s answers to these hermeneutic concerns, we will not only gain a better sense of how Marion sees his own project, but how the larger world of phenomenology situates itself in relation to hermeneutics, and where further lines of hermeneutic study might complement and challenge these insights.</p>

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The hermeneutics of Jean-Luc Marion: a new look at an old critique

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月22日

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  • Stephanie Rumpza

摘要

In this paper, I argue against a common evaluation of the phenomenology of Jean-Luc Marion, namely, that it lacks a sufficient place for hermeneutics. This critique, which has been advanced since his early work, puts forward three major objections: (1) by holding givenness as absolute, Marion betrays the phenomenological breakthrough he claims to defend; (2) by recasting the role of the subject as the receptive adonné, he renders the self passive and undermines our freedom in the process of knowing; (3) by placing initiative on the given as arriving from outside our anticipations, Marion refuses any horizon of interpretation, whether history, tradition, culture, language, or practice, even though these things are structurally necessary to our understanding. Against this common view, I will argue that Marion has provided an adequate response to each of these critiques. In Part I, I will discuss the first two objections through Marion’s essay “The Hermeneutics of Givenness.” In Part II, I will extend this discussion to the extremes by considering the radical cases of saturated phenomena, building on Revelation Comes from Elsewhere. Finally, in Part III I will consider the broader hermeneutic horizons of language, culture, and history with a special attention to La métaphysique et après. By bringing to light Marion’s answers to these hermeneutic concerns, we will not only gain a better sense of how Marion sees his own project, but how the larger world of phenomenology situates itself in relation to hermeneutics, and where further lines of hermeneutic study might complement and challenge these insights.