<p>The fundamental intuition of incompatibilism is that, for an agent capable of free will, the future is not predetermined. For classical incompatibilism, this intuition leads to the assertion that free will implies the existence of alternative possibilities understood as already defined futures (e.g. telling the truth or lying, helping someone or not, etc.) between which the agent can choose. The problem is that this conception implies the introduction of an element of chance into free will. In contrast, for Bergson’s incompatibilism, this intuition leads to the assertion that free will implies the existence of an irreducibly singular cause whose effect cannot be predetermined. This form of incompatibilism does not imply alternative possibilities, nor the problem of chance that goes with them. According to Bergson, the irreducibly singular cause of free will is our “fundamental self,” that is to say our personal view of the world. This view is the active synthesis of our past experience and our biological individuality. In this sense, it has a certain rationality. Furthermore, thanks to contact with open morality, it can also have a moral dimension. The action of this view requires what Bergson calls a high degree of “tension of memory,” that is, a specific psychological duration.</p>