<p>Both Husserl’s and Levinas’ phenomenologies conceive an intrinsic relationship between ethics and the idea of God. It is not clear however how one should understand this relationship and what could be its proper phenomenological value. I&#xa0;argue in this article that the idea of God has a specific henomenological meaning for ethics, as it is conceived both by the later Husserl and by Levinas. This phenomenological meaning resides in the structure of ethical subjectivity, insofar as its relationship with the good, both as striving towards the good and as obligation to be good, necessarily entails the recognition of the idea of God. Both in Husserl’s and in Levinas’ phenomenologies the idea of God bears a necessary relationship to infinity: it is indeed understood as infinitely distant being (Husserl) or as idea of the infinite itself (Levinas), and generates a form of striving towards an ethical ideal (Husserl) or a form of ethical obligation (Levinas).</p>

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Phenomenological understandings of the relationship between ethics and the idea of God

  • Veronica Cibotaru

摘要

Both Husserl’s and Levinas’ phenomenologies conceive an intrinsic relationship between ethics and the idea of God. It is not clear however how one should understand this relationship and what could be its proper phenomenological value. I argue in this article that the idea of God has a specific henomenological meaning for ethics, as it is conceived both by the later Husserl and by Levinas. This phenomenological meaning resides in the structure of ethical subjectivity, insofar as its relationship with the good, both as striving towards the good and as obligation to be good, necessarily entails the recognition of the idea of God. Both in Husserl’s and in Levinas’ phenomenologies the idea of God bears a necessary relationship to infinity: it is indeed understood as infinitely distant being (Husserl) or as idea of the infinite itself (Levinas), and generates a form of striving towards an ethical ideal (Husserl) or a form of ethical obligation (Levinas).