<p>It has been a matter of great contention how one might demarcate what counts as part of the logical vocabulary. In this paper I want to combine three key thoughts into a new way of demarcating the logical vocabulary. These are the following: that logic should be topic-neutral; that the topic neutrality of logic is best captured through the subject matter transparency of the logical vocabulary; and that some expressions containing non-logical vocabulary may vary in subject matter across modal space. The end-result will be a characterization of what I am calling “topic theoretic invariantism”: that an expression is part of the logical vocabulary if and only if its world-invariant subject matter is the trivial subject matter.</p>

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Topic Theoretic Invariantism

  • Francisca Silva

摘要

It has been a matter of great contention how one might demarcate what counts as part of the logical vocabulary. In this paper I want to combine three key thoughts into a new way of demarcating the logical vocabulary. These are the following: that logic should be topic-neutral; that the topic neutrality of logic is best captured through the subject matter transparency of the logical vocabulary; and that some expressions containing non-logical vocabulary may vary in subject matter across modal space. The end-result will be a characterization of what I am calling “topic theoretic invariantism”: that an expression is part of the logical vocabulary if and only if its world-invariant subject matter is the trivial subject matter.