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<p>Do I have a moral right to do something which is all-things-considered impermissible? On some accounts, the answer is ‘yes’, on others ‘no’. However, no current accounts allow a parity of reasoning about rights between the law and morality whereby a right to do something wrong sometimes applies and sometimes does not—e.g., in US 1st Amendment case law speech is sometimes protected and sometimes not. This paper uses a novel account of the defeasibility of rights to show how some morally wrong things can sometimes fall within our moral rights, and other times not, consistent with the protected/unprotected distinction in US free speech case law. The results follow without a discrete right to do wrong using a revised notion of the distinction between rights infringement and rights violations that can also solve related puzzles around rights infringement and compensation.</p>

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Revising the Right to Do Wrong

  • 期刊论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年5月18日

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  • Cody Gomez

摘要

Do I have a moral right to do something which is all-things-considered impermissible? On some accounts, the answer is ‘yes’, on others ‘no’. However, no current accounts allow a parity of reasoning about rights between the law and morality whereby a right to do something wrong sometimes applies and sometimes does not—e.g., in US 1st Amendment case law speech is sometimes protected and sometimes not. This paper uses a novel account of the defeasibility of rights to show how some morally wrong things can sometimes fall within our moral rights, and other times not, consistent with the protected/unprotected distinction in US free speech case law. The results follow without a discrete right to do wrong using a revised notion of the distinction between rights infringement and rights violations that can also solve related puzzles around rights infringement and compensation.