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<p>There has been increasing scepticism about the meaning, relevance, and normative import of treason legislation. Relatedly, there is scepticism about whether treason constitutes a distinct moral wrong. These worries are often grounded in either the idea that the distinctive wrong is instead in the substantive act that is done with treasonous intent, such as assault or sabotage, or the view that the wrong of treason reflects a conception of the relationship between the individual and the state that is no longer relevant. I defend the idea that treason is a distinctive wrong. Instead of relying on the common thought that treason involves a betrayal, I argue that treason is distinctively wrong because it undermines our ability to fulfil important political obligations. I draw out some implications of this view.</p>

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Against Treason: An Argument from Political Obligation

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年8月3日

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  • Felix Westeren

摘要

There has been increasing scepticism about the meaning, relevance, and normative import of treason legislation. Relatedly, there is scepticism about whether treason constitutes a distinct moral wrong. These worries are often grounded in either the idea that the distinctive wrong is instead in the substantive act that is done with treasonous intent, such as assault or sabotage, or the view that the wrong of treason reflects a conception of the relationship between the individual and the state that is no longer relevant. I defend the idea that treason is a distinctive wrong. Instead of relying on the common thought that treason involves a betrayal, I argue that treason is distinctively wrong because it undermines our ability to fulfil important political obligations. I draw out some implications of this view.