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<p>This article responds to seven Comments on my book, R<span>easonableness</span> <span>and </span>R<span>isk</span>: R<span>ight</span> <span>and</span> R<span>esponsibility in the</span> L<span>aw of</span> T<span>orts</span> (Oxford, 2022). <i>Inter alia</i>, the comments question whether, on my view, torts are really wrongs; whether harm-based strict liabilities are conditional wrongs; whether my account of harm in the law of torts is objectionably stigmatizing; whether it can make sense of tort’s measurement of damages and its treatment of relational harm; whether my view can capture the relational character of tort duties; whether my view is deontological or instrumental; and whether I can account for tort law’s distinction between affirmative and negative duties. I argue that, for the most part, these objections can be met and suggest how.</p>

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Seven Critics

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年10月28日

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  • Gregory C. Keating

摘要

This article responds to seven Comments on my book, Reasonableness and Risk: Right and Responsibility in the Law of Torts (Oxford, 2022). Inter alia, the comments question whether, on my view, torts are really wrongs; whether harm-based strict liabilities are conditional wrongs; whether my account of harm in the law of torts is objectionably stigmatizing; whether it can make sense of tort’s measurement of damages and its treatment of relational harm; whether my view can capture the relational character of tort duties; whether my view is deontological or instrumental; and whether I can account for tort law’s distinction between affirmative and negative duties. I argue that, for the most part, these objections can be met and suggest how.