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Objectives <p>We investigate the causal effects of non-binding sentencing policy recommendations made by top-level penal authorities within the limits of existing legislation. Specifically, we examine a campaign aimed to increase the imposition of fines in criminal sentencing. The campaign was conducted by the Supreme Prosecutor and the President of the Supreme Court in the Czech Republic and consisted of policy meetings with chief regional prosecutors and seminars for judges and prosecutors.</p> Methods <p>Using administrative case-level data, we employ two alternative empirical strategies to identify the effects of the two separate parts of the campaign: an event study design to investigate the effects of the policy meetings and difference-in-differences to investigate the effects of seminars for judges and prosecutors.</p> Results <p>The policy meetings with the chief prosecutors increased the probability of a fine being imposed by 7 percentage points, while judges who participated in the campaign seminars were 6 percentage points more likely to impose a fine afterwards. These interventions had heterogeneous effects both at the court and judge levels, such as decreasing differences between judges. The increased imposition of fines substituted for suspended prison sentences.</p> Conclusions <p>Penal authorities can bring about substantial changes in sentencing policy in the absence of any legislative changes through informal influence and recommendations. Meetings and seminars at which the top authorities communicate their policy preferences to prosecutors and judges, provide guidance, and demonstrate examples of good practice can be highly effective. We document that the effect of such interventions operates to a substantial extent via prosecutors, even though judges are not bound by prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations. Our findings emphasize the role played by prosecutors at sentencing in continental systems.</p>

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Law or Authority: How Czech Penal Elites Shaped Sentencing Policy by Non-Binding Interventions

  • 期刊论文

  • 出版模式：

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  • 发表日期：

    2025年8月1日

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  • Jakub Drápal,
  • Libor Dušek

摘要

Objectives

We investigate the causal effects of non-binding sentencing policy recommendations made by top-level penal authorities within the limits of existing legislation. Specifically, we examine a campaign aimed to increase the imposition of fines in criminal sentencing. The campaign was conducted by the Supreme Prosecutor and the President of the Supreme Court in the Czech Republic and consisted of policy meetings with chief regional prosecutors and seminars for judges and prosecutors.

Methods

Using administrative case-level data, we employ two alternative empirical strategies to identify the effects of the two separate parts of the campaign: an event study design to investigate the effects of the policy meetings and difference-in-differences to investigate the effects of seminars for judges and prosecutors.

Results

The policy meetings with the chief prosecutors increased the probability of a fine being imposed by 7 percentage points, while judges who participated in the campaign seminars were 6 percentage points more likely to impose a fine afterwards. These interventions had heterogeneous effects both at the court and judge levels, such as decreasing differences between judges. The increased imposition of fines substituted for suspended prison sentences.

Conclusions

Penal authorities can bring about substantial changes in sentencing policy in the absence of any legislative changes through informal influence and recommendations. Meetings and seminars at which the top authorities communicate their policy preferences to prosecutors and judges, provide guidance, and demonstrate examples of good practice can be highly effective. We document that the effect of such interventions operates to a substantial extent via prosecutors, even though judges are not bound by prosecutors’ sentencing recommendations. Our findings emphasize the role played by prosecutors at sentencing in continental systems.