<p><?tk 4?>There is a debate between Proponents and Skeptics about the epistemic value of travel. Proponents argue that there are normative reasons that speak in favour of travel based on the kinds of knowledge, beliefs, or other epistemically relevant features that we might acquire through travelling recreationally. Skeptics deny that travel provides distinctive epistemic value such as to give us normative reasons that speak in favour of it. In this paper we explore this debate. Our first goal is to clear up what is at stake. We argue that Proponents and Skeptics are arguing about whether travel has epistemic value that plays a <i>moral justificatory function</i>. There are the large moral costs to travel (e.g., environmental damage, over-tourism). So, there needs to be some normative reason that speaks in favour of travel that makes travel morally permissible. The debate about the epistemic value of travel is (partly) a debate about whether travel can provide value that could justify travel and make it permissible despite these costs. Our second goal is to provide an account of the epistemic value of travel that could at least potentially serve this justificatory function. We argue that leisure travel puts agents into a position in which they must consciously modify their <i>default signal/noise processing</i>. Put simply, travel provides epistemic value because it changes something about the agent and the way the agent processes information. Our account ultimately offers a middle point for both Proponents and Skeptics of the epistemic value of travel: It vindicates Proponents while still taking onboard the objections Skeptics offer. </p>