<p>How can we study normative questions, the subject matter of normative moral and political philosophy? A common answer is: by relying on our normative intuitions. This paper argues that this method lacks support: we have no good reasons to think we can learn about the normative by relying on our normative intuitions (or ‘considered judgements’). This is argued by examining the six most promising justifications that have been offered for relying on normative intuitions: (1) tracking via a third factor; (2) analogies or companions in guilt; (3) taking intuitions at face value, or phenomenal conservatism; (4) that there are no alternatives; (5) coherentism and reflective equilibrium; and (6) articulation of implicit normative commitments, or mentalism. None of these provide robust support for the practice of relying on normative intuitions. What we should rely on when studying normative questions remains a burning question for anyone who wants to do normative moral or political philosophy.</p>